

Towards Functional Verification of eBPF Programs

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IMPERIAL

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eBPF Deployed in Important Places




cilium




Falco

eBPF Programs May Be Written By Others



eBPF Marketplaces



AI Code Generation

There is a need to verify the behaviour of eBPF programs

eBPF Verifier



Safety

- No unsafe memory access
- Termination



Functionality


- Return value
- Side effects

Verification of Individual Programs is Insufficient

Behaviour of eBPF Programs is highly dependent on external interactions

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


BPF Maps
Contents


Valid
Packet


XDP Firewall





Maps

Application waiting
for packet














**Problem: maps
influence the
behaviour of
programs**




Verification of Individual Programs is Insufficient

Behaviour of eBPF Programs is highly dependent external interactions







Problem: the ordering of programs can change the behaviour

Also important to analyse a program's external interactions

Introducing DRACO

- Verify behaviour of individual eBPF programs against a specification format
- Analyse how eBPF program's external interactions affects program behaviour

*Initially focus on XDP programs

DRACO Insight

- Loaded eBPF programs have to pass the kernel verifier
 - Bounded number of execution paths
 - Ideal for Exhaustive Symbolic Execution (ESE)
 - Avoids path explosion

Symbolic Execution

- Symbolic Execution is a technique to explore possible execution paths in a program
 - Path explosion from branching and loops
- KLEE is a Symbolic Execution Engine on the LLVM level



DRACO: Verifying Individual Programs


- External Specifications
- Integrated Specifications

Integrated Specifications

- Embedded throughout the eBPF program
- Temporal assertions across two points of the program
 - Where the assertion is located
 - When the program terminates
- ESE in KLEE explores and makes relevant assertions in all paths

Integrated Specification Examples

```
ethernet = data ;  
BPF_ASSERT_CONSTANT(ethernet, sizeof(*ethernet));
```



BPF_ASSERT_CONSTANT
asserts a memory location
remains constant

```
BPF_ASSERT_IF_ACTION_THEN_NEQ(XDP_DROP, &(ip->protocol), __u8, IPPROTO_TCP);
```

```
nh_off += sizeof(*ip);  
if (data + nh_off > data_end)  
    goto EOP;  
  
if(ip->protocol != IPPROTO_TCP){  
    goto EOP;  
}
```

BPF_ASSERT_IF_ACTION_THEN_EQ asserts that if an XDP action is returned the given memory location must not be equal to the given value

```
BPF_ASSERT_RETURN(XDP_TX);
```

BPF_ASSERT_RETURN asserts that the given XDP action must be returned

```
int key = ip->saddr;  
int value = 1;  
bpf_map_update_elem(&example_map, &key, &value, 0);
```

```
BPF_RETURN(XDP_TX);
```

Read paper
for more
examples

```
EOP:|
```

```
BPF_RETURN(XDP_DROP);
```


Driver Program for Verifying Integrated Specifications

1. System of arrays is declared by driver program
2. Relevant Information is enqueued onto arrays when execution passes through assertion:
memory locations, sizes, bytes, return values

Driver Program for Verifying Integrated Specifications

3. When program terminates, go through enqueued assertions

```
BPF_ASSERT_IF_ACTION_THEN_NEQ(XDP_DROP, &(ip->protocol), __u8, IPPROTO_TCP);
```



External Specification

- Executable program written in any language compliable to LLVM
- Implement the same functionality as the eBPF program
 - But not the same safety and performance requirements
- ESE in KLEE to verify program against specification
- Specification can be either *full* or *partial*
 - Return value
 - Changes to BPF Maps
 - Changes to network packet



~~eBPF Verifier~~


Read paper
for details

DRACO: Analysing Program Interactions

- Determine if the order of execution of two eBPF programs matters
- Identify dependencies between BPF maps
- Identify how BPF map contents affects program branching

Checking if Order of Execution Matters

- BPF Map and Packet Data
- Written to by both programs or
Written to by one program and read by the other



Checking if Order of Execution Matters

```
define dso_local i32 @ xdp_prog(%struct xdp_md* %ctx) #5 section "xdp_
XDP " {
    ...
    %3 =
    %data
i32 0,
    %4 =
    %conv3 = zext i32 %4 to i64
    %5 = inttoptr i64 %conv3 to i8
    store i8* %5, i8** %data, align 8
}
```

Extend KLEE to:


For every path,

1. Check if memory location is BPF map / network packet
2. Add to ReadSet / WriteSet accordingly
3. Check if there is any overlap in both programs' sets

ign 8
dp_md* %3,

DRACO: Analysing Program Interactions

- Determine if the order of execution of two eBPF programs matters
- Identify dependencies between BPF maps
- Identify how BPF map contents affects program branching



Read paper
for details

Evaluation Criteria

- Specification LOC



- Time



Evaluation of DRACO Verification



Program	LOC	Type	Spec	Paths	Time
hXDP FW	686	Full	27	64	6.93s
hXDP FW	686	Full	18	4	3.45s
Fluvia	156	Partial	4	23	23.35s
Katran	4244	Partial	17	10	71.24s
CRAB	365	Assert	20	5	1.90s

Read paper
for details

Concluding Remarks

- Verified eBPF programs are suitable for further verification and analysis using symbolic execution
- Verification can be integrated as part of deployment pipeline
- eBPF programs' behaviour are dependent on external interactions, it is beneficial to analyse the interactions of eBPF programs during development

Thank you!